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THE HUMANITIES
Meat Animals, Humane 
Standards and Other Legal 
Fictions
David N. Cassuto
Pace Law School, White Plains, NY
Abstract
Law and food are distinct concepts, though the discipline (Law and Food) implies a relationship 
worthy of study. The conjunction (“and”) creates meaning. However, its absence also conveys 
meaning. For example, “meat animal” suggests that animals can be both meat and animal. This 
conflation has powerful legal implications. National Meat Association v. Harris (2012) makes chillingly 
plain the law’s indifference to whether a meat animal is alive or dead. This essay examines the 
way supposedly humane federal practices ignore the systematic brutalization of “food animals” 
as those animals get processed into marketable flesh. It concludes with some observations about 
why this legal blindness exists.
Keywords
National Meat Association v. Harris, humane, meat animal, industrial agriculture, National Meat 
Inspection Act, preemption, slaughterhouse, Supreme Court
I. Introduction
Even as it is conjunctive, the discipline of “Law and Food” is oppositional. Law and food 
are discrete concepts yet the presence of a conjunction (“and”) implies a relationship wor-
thy of study. Similarly, the absence of a conjunction can impart meaning as well. For 
example, “and” is noticeably missing from the term “meat animal.” That absence denotes 
a lack of separation between meat and animals. Indeed, within the term, meat functions as 
a descriptive adjective and a noun. It suggests that an animal can simultaneously be both 
meat and animal. This conflation has powerful legal implications, as evidenced in the 
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Supreme Court’s decision in National Meat Association v. Harris (2012).1 Harris 
addressed the issue of whether a California law regulating the slaughter of downer ani-
mals (livestock that is either too sick, too injured, or both, to walk) was preempted by 
federal law. The Court’s reasoning makes chillingly plain the law’s indifference to 
whether a meat animal is alive or dead.
This essay begins with a summary of the Harris case. While Harris turns mainly on 
the issue of preemption (i.e. whether federal law regulating the treatment of animals at 
slaughterhouses conflicts with state law, in which case federal law trumps),2 that is not 
the focus here. Instead, this essay looks at how the Court elided the manner in which 
supposedly humane federal practices ignore the mechanized and systematic brutalization 
of “food animals” (another conjunction-less term) as they get processed from living 
beings into marketable flesh. The essay concludes with some observations about why 
this willful legal blindness exists and what it portends.
II. The Case
In many instances, animals arriving at the slaughterhouse cannot walk. The rigors of the 
industrial food process and subsequent transport to slaughter leave them sick, injured, or 
both. Because these downers represent a potential monetary loss, workers sometimes go 
to extraordinary lengths (often with the complicity and encouragement of management) 
to get the animals on to their feet and staggering toward the killing floor. In 2008, the 
Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) released undercover video footage show-
ing workers at the Hallmark Meat Packing Company, a slaughterhouse in California, 
kicking, jabbing, using electric prods, high pressure hoses, a fork lift, and other brutal 
methods in order to get downed animals to walk. That video led to the largest meat recall 
in history. It also led California to amend Section 599 of its Penal Code to state (in rele-
vant part):
(a) No slaughterhouse, stockyard, auction, market agency, or dealer shall buy, sell, or 
receive a nonambulatory animal.
(b) No slaughterhouse shall process, butcher, or sell meat or products of nonambula-
tory animals for human consumption.
(c) No slaughterhouse shall hold a nonambulatory animal without taking immediate 
action to humanely euthanize the animal.3
The National Meat Association (NMA), a trade association representing packers and 
processors of livestock, filed suit against the State of California, claiming that the state 
law was preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA).4 The FMIA states that 
animal handling requirements that are “in addition to, or different than those made under 
1. National Meat Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 965 (2012).
2. U.S. Const. art.VI, cl. 2.
3. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 599f.
4. 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.
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this [Act] may not be imposed by any State.”5 The NMA argued that this clause expressly 
preempts any state law that mandates different standards for downer treatment at 
slaughterhouses.
The district court granted the NMA’s request for a preliminary injunction but the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that California’s law was not 
preempted because it regulates only the type of animal that can be slaughtered rather than 
the inspection or slaughtering process itself.6 The NMA appealed, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed. A unanimous Court, per Justice Kagan, held that the 
California statute made illegal some methods of processing downer animals that are legal 
under the FMIA. Consequently, it presented a clear conflict between state and federal 
law and, per the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause; the state law must give way.
The preemption question (though dispositive in the case) is not the primary focus 
here. Rather, this essay examines the way the Court interpreted the provisions of the 
FMIA and other federal laws and regulations on its way to concluding that they guaran-
tee humane handling.
1 Humane Rhetoric
Justice Kagan begins by noting that the FMIA was passed in 1906 in the wake of public 
outcry following publication of The Jungle, by Upton Sinclair. The Jungle, though a 
work of fiction, graphically depicted actual conditions in the meatpacking industry and 
led to widespread public dismay. According to Kagan, the FMIA sought to alleviate pub-
lic concerns by establishing procedures whereby “live animals and carcasses” would be 
inspected “to prevent the shipment of impure, unwholesome and unfit meat and meat 
food products.”7 She goes on to observe that subsequent amendments to the Act require 
slaughterhouses to comply with the standards for humane handling and slaughter as laid 
out in the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958 (HMSA).8
Two things about this initial paragraph are noteworthy. First, in describing the inspec-
tion standards for livestock, Kagan merges live animals and carcasses into one sentence. 
She thus establishes at the outset that the law recognizes little distinction between living 
and dead animals. Kagan then switches rhetorical gears to address the concerns about 
animal treatment raised by the Hallmark case. Slaughterhouses, she notes, must comply 
with federal standards for humane treatment set forth in the HMSA.9 Putting aside the 
irony of citing a slaughter statute as the standard for humane treatment, neither the statute 
nor its regulations offers much in the way of animal welfare guidelines. For instance, the 
regulations note that when driving livestock, electric prods and other implements should 
5. 21 U.S.C. § 678. It bears noting that the statute also contains a “Savings Clause” that expressly 
permits state regulation so long as it is consistent with the provisions and regulations of the 
FMIA.
6. National Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010).
7. Opinion at 967, quoting Pittsburgh Melting Co. v. Totten, 248 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1918).
8. 7 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.
9. 7 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.
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be used “as little as possible so as minimize excitement and injury.”10 However, the phrase 
“as little as possible” gives the driver such wide latitude that the regulation becomes all 
but meaningless. Furthermore, despite its name, the HMSA was primarily designed to 
ease the lot of slaughterhouse workers rather than the animals being slaughtered.11
In addition, though the statute requires that animals be rendered senseless before 
being shackled, hoisted and cut, the rapidity of the modern industrial kill line ensures that 
there will inevitably be some inaccurate stun blows. That means that some percentage 
(even 0.5% still amounts to thousands of animals) is not properly stunned. Those poorly 
stunned animals are often skinned alive.12 And, while not relevant to this lawsuit, it is 
nevertheless noteworthy that the HMSA excludes birds.13 Consequently, 98% of the 
more than ten billion animals killed annually in the United States for food lack even the 
small protections afforded by the law. In light of all this, the Court’s reliance on existing 
federal law as a guarantor of humane treatment seems misplaced.
Kagan turns next to the regulatory matrix, explaining that the United States Department 
of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has over 9,000 
inspectors who performed “ante mortem” inspections of over 147 million head of live-
stock in 2010. If during the course of such inspections the inspector finds evidence of 
disease or injury, that animal is labeled “U.S. Condemned.” Those downer animals must 
be placed in a covered pen and cannot be dragged while conscious (although they may 
be moved with “suitable” equipment). They are then killed in a separate facility, with no 
part of the carcass sold for human consumption. The inspector may also designate ani-
mals with less severe conditions as “U.S. Suspect.” “Suspect” animals must be slaugh-
tered separately following which the inspector performs a “post mortem” inspection to 
determine which parts of their carcasses are fit for human consumption.14
Precious little (a covered pen and mandated senselessness during dragging) in the 
Act’s language suggests humane treatment. This should not surprise. The inspecting 
agency is, after all, the Food Safety and Inspection Service. Food is what animals become 
once they are dead. The agency’s concern resides not with the welfare of the living ani-
mals but rather with the quality of the flesh entering the food supply. Viewed through the 
FSIS’s lens, living animals might best be classified as “pre-food.” The FSIS’s mission 
likely reflects public concerns. Most of the hue and cry following the HSUS undercover 
video at the Hallmark California facility was not about the treatment of the animals but 
10. 9 CFR § 313.2.
11. 7 U.S.C. § 1901; Pub.L. 107–171, Title X, § 10305, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 493; See also, 
Jennifer L. Mariucci, ‘‘The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Deficiencies and Proposed 
Amendments,’’ 4 J. Animal L. 149, 150 (2008).
12. Jennifer L. Mariucci, ‘‘The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Deficiencies and Proposed 
Amendments,’’ 4 J. Animal L. 149, 156 (2008).
13. Levine v. Connor, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986 
(9th Cir. 2009). See also, The Poultry Production and Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 451(federal 
law pertaining to the inspection and slaughter of poultry which does not provide any humane 
slaughtering requirements).
14. 9 C.F.R. § 309 et seq.
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rather about the fact that meat from the animals had found its way into the nation’s school 
lunch supply.
Even on its own terms, however, the FSIS fails. Kagan notes that some 9,000 inspec-
tors inspected 147 million animals as well as an additional 126,000 “humane handling 
verification procedures” and however many post-mortem inspections their 147 million 
inspections required. To put these responsibilities in perspective, consider for the moment 
only the initial inspections and assume that 2010 was an average year. We know that in 
2010, 9,000 inspectors inspected 147,000,000 animals. That means that each inspector 
inspected an average of approximately 16,330 animals. If every inspector works forty-
eight weeks a year, five days per week, eight hours per day, and if we assume that all they 
do is live inspect animals, then this would mean that each of them inspects slightly more 
than eight animals per hour. That might seem possible if ante-mortem inspections were 
all they did. But it is not all they do. Furthermore, even if it were all they did, this hourly 
inspection rate does not align with the hourly kill rate at a slaughterhouse.
Take hog slaughter, for example. Depending on the distance between inspection sta-
tions, the number of inspectors on the kill line, and whether the head is attached to the 
carcass, the federally set, hourly kill rate ranges from 140–253 hogs per hour. Recall that 
if all the FSIS inspectors are deployed doing pre-slaughter inspections, then they are 
each theoretically inspecting eight animals per hour prior to slaughter. If that number is 
accurate,15 the second number seems implausible. The animals must be inspected prior 
to slaughter and the inspection rate is eight animals per hour; logic and basic math dictate 
that the hourly slaughter rate also should not exceed eight animals per inspector. But it 
does, unless there are upwards of twenty inspectors doing pre-slaughter inspections (in 
addition to those present on the kill line) at each hog slaughterhouse. And we have not 
even considered the aforementioned post-mortem inspections as well as all the other 
responsibilities that make up an inspector’s typical work day. Clearly, the inspectors do 
many more than eight ante-mortem inspections per hour, which leads one to wonder just 
how much rigor and oversight such inspections provide. The opinion ignores these ques-
tions, insisting that federal law offers ample protections to animals bound for slaughter.
2 The Law and the Opinion Self-Contradict
The first sentence of the opinion following the traditional summary sentence states: “The 
FMIA regulates a broad range of activities at slaughterhouses to ensure the safety of the 
meat and the humane handling of animals.” This sentence sets the tone of the opinion, 
declaring that both the law and the Court take such matters into account. A few para-
graphs later, Kagan notes that “the FMIA additionally prescribe[s] methods for handling 
animals humanely at all stages of the slaughtering process.” Shortly thereafter, having 
turned her attention to the preemption question, Kagan asks us to “[c]onsider what the 
two statutes [the FMIA and the challenged California law] tell a slaughterhouse to do 
15. 9 C.F.R. § 310.1. Because inspection rates differ for cattle, the math here is not entirely accu-
rate. However, the kill rate for cattle is also well over eight animals per hour (see id.) so the 
degree of variance does not change the overall conclusion.
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when (as not infrequently occurs) a pig becomes injured and thus nonambulatory some-
time after delivery to the slaughterhouse” (emphasis mine). So, in the space of a few 
paragraphs we learn that the FMIA guarantees the humane handling of animals at slaugh-
ter facilities and that those same animals are often so badly injured subsequent to arrival 
that they are rendered unable to walk.
While these two statements seem mutually exclusive, they become less incongruous 
as Kagan describes what humane handling means in the context of the FMIA. Under the 
FMIA, she explains, “a slaughterhouse may hold (without euthanizing) any nonambula-
tory pig that has not been condemned . . . And the slaughterhouse may process or butcher 
such an animal’s meat for human consumption, subject to an FSIS official’s approval at 
a post-mortem inspection.” Thus we learn that the FMIA, which supposedly guarantees 
an animal’s humane handling upon arrival at the slaughter facility, allows animals which 
have been seriously injured after their arrival to be butchered for human consumption. 
Since such animals can be butchered and sold into the food supply, there exists little 
disincentive for industrial meat producers and their transporters to invest in the animals’ 
wellbeing.
The only relevant consideration for producers is whether the animals have reached 
maximal slaughter weight and are free of diseases or other issues that might impact sal-
ability. These criteria can be achieved despite housing the animals under brutal condi-
tions.16 By contrast, California § 599f would have required producers and transporters to 
ensure that the animals were at least well enough to walk. Under § 599f, if the animals 
could not walk, slaughterhouses could not receive them, and the producers would have 
to absorb the consequent economic loss. As Justice Kagan notes, § 599f and the FMIA 
“require different things of a slaughterhouse confronted with a delivery truck containing 
nonambulatory swine. The former says ‘do not receive or buy them’; the latter does not.” 
Consequently, unlike the FMIA, § 599f created a de-facto financial penalty for inhumane 
handling. This distinction forms the heart of the Court’s holding. California sought to 
erect a regulatory deterrent to the trade of downer animals. The Court held that federal 
law explicitly enabled such trade and thus the federal and state laws were in irresolvable 
conflict and the state law must yield. As Kagan observes, “According to the Court of 
Appeals, ‘states are free to decide which animals may be turned into meat.’ We think not” 
(internal citations omitted).
How then should we interpret the Court’s statement that “[t]he FMIA addresses not 
just food safety, but humane treatment as well?” It clearly does not encompass any 
16. Senator Robert Byrd, in a famous speech on the Senate floor, decried the state of agricultural 
animal welfare: ‘‘Our inhumane treatment of livestock is becoming widespread and more 
and more barbaric. Six-hundred-pound hogs – they were pigs at one time – raised in two-foot 
wide metal cages called gestation crates, in which the poor beasts are unable to turn around 
or lie down in natural positions, and this way they live for months at a time. On profit-driven 
factory farms, veal calves are confined to dark wooden crates so small that they are prevented 
from lying down or scratching themselves. These creatures feel; they know pain. They suffer 
pain just as we humans suffer pain. Egg-laying hens are confined to battery cages. Unable to 
spread their wings, they are reduced to nothing more than egg-laying machines.’’ 147 Cong. 
Rec. S7310 (daily ed., July 9, 2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
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regulatory deterrent to animal mistreatment. Instead, humane handling means something 
different in the FMIA than in other contexts. Under the FMIA, the term has little to do 
with protecting animals from injury or treating them gently when such injuries occur. 
Severe, pre-slaughter injuries to animals apparently are to be expected, are not inhu-
mane, and need not interfere with the production process. In addition, injured animals 
can be safely and legally processed for human consumption, thus mitigating any poten-
tial financial hardships arising from their (mis)treatment.
Accounting for the disparity between traditional notions of humane handling and the 
version offered by the FMIA requires careful attention to context. As noted earlier, the 
title of the law, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, offers an indication of federal regulatory 
priorities. In effect, as long as the animals’ treatment does not undermine the food supply, 
it is “humane.” The law seeks not to safeguard animals prior to death but to vouchsafe 
that whatever they endured did not impede their smooth transition into meat. Viewed 
thus, if a “humanely handled” pig is the signifier, a pathogen-free pork chop becomes the 
signified. The living animal does not merit legal consideration because it has not yet fully 
transformed from “meat animal” into ‘‘meat.”
3 Treating Meat Humanely
The FMIA’s interpretation of humane treatment forms part of a larger regulatory vacuum 
with respect to the welfare of farmed animals. When Justice Kagan notes that the FMIA 
regulates behavior once animals arrive at slaughter (they are treated humanely, we’re 
told, despite their frequently becoming nonambulatory), she omits any discussion of the 
animals’ treatment prior to arrival. This omission is understandable since the challenged 
statute dealt with slaughterhouse regulation. Nevertheless, the condition of downer ani-
mals has much more to do with their treatment prior to arrival at the slaughterhouse than 
with where their last few hours get spent.
Consider the Twenty-Eight Hour Law,17 for example. The Twenty-Eight Hour Law 
requires that animals not be confined for more than twenty-eight continuous hours when 
being transported across state lines in a “rail carrier, express carrier, or common carrier 
(except by air or water)” without at least five hours of rest, watering and feeding.18 
Putting aside the fact that for years and until only recently, the USDA maintained that the 
law did not apply to trucks despite trucks forming the principal means of animal trans-
port,19 simple math once again reveals the extent of the law’s indifference to animal 
welfare.
17. Livestock Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 80502.
18. 45 U.S.C. § 71 (1906); See also David J. Wolfson, ‘‘Beyond the Law,’’ 2 Animal L. 123, 125 
(1996).
19. See USDA, ‘‘Cattle and Swine Trucking Guide for Exporters’’ (stating “Federal law requires 
that livestock in interstate commerce be in transit for no more than 28 hours without food, 
water, and rest. However, this law applies only to rail shipments.”) Available at: http://www.
ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3008268; See also, ‘‘USDA to Start 
Regulating the Transport of Farmed Animals on Trucks,’’ Compassion Over Killing, 2005. 
Available at: http://www.cok.net/feat/28_hour_law/
8 Law, Culture and the Humanities 0(0)
The law states that animals may not be confined for more than twenty-eight consecu-
tive hours without being given a rest, food and water. Phrased in the positive, that means 
that animals can be confined in small cages stacked on trucks, trains, or other transport 
without food and water for up to twenty-eight hours without any respite. Furthermore, 
the law is almost never enforced and even if it were, the $500 fine for offenders is an 
easily absorbed cost of doing business.20 Clearly, such a law was not designed with ani-
mal wellbeing in mind (something the legislative history bears out).21
As further evidence of federal regulatory disregard, one need venture no further than 
the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The AWA is the only federal law that directly addresses 
animal welfare yet it specifically excludes agricultural animals from its ambit.22 This 
leaves exactly no laws governing the treatment of animals used in agriculture. This lack 
epitomizes what J.B. Ruhl has called the “vast anti-law”23 of industrial agriculture. It is 
not that Congress is indifferent to the issues raised by factory-farming. It is rather that 
Congress has deliberately chosen to ignore them. The tailoring of the AWA, the impo-
tence of the Twenty-Eight Hour Law, and the disingenuous language of the FMIA form 
part of the larger phenomenon of deliberate legislative and juridical exclusion of animals 
qua animals (rather than animals qua meat) from the regulatory process. This exclusion 
results partly from the continued potency of Jeffersonian agrarian myths and their (mis)
use by modern agro-industry and partly from the conflation of mass production with 
efficient production.
From “Right to Farm” laws at the local level to water and crop subsidies at the federal 
level, the industry has successfully parleyed its image as a group of small farmers work-
ing the land against all odds and for very little money into a very potent political tool and 
enormous economic gain. Agriculture enjoys significant governmental protections and 
subsidies. Those gains, however, came at a cost.
III. How the Meat Animal Came About
1 Agriculture → Agribusiness: “Get Big or Get Out”
In the 1970s, Earl Butz, President Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture exhorted farmers to 
“get big or get out” and to regard themselves as “agribusinessmen” rather than farmers.24 
20. See Robyn Mallon, ‘‘The Deplorable Standard of Living Faced by Farm Animals in America’s 
Meat Industry and How to Improve Conditions by Eliminating the Corporate Farm,’’ 9 Mich. 
State Univ. J of Med & L.389, 399 (2005) (explaining that even when a law protecting farm 
animals exists “[t]he law is violated due to the traditional corporate attitude of wanting to 
maximize profit and minimize expenses.”).
21. PL 103–272, July 5, 1994, 108 Stat 745.
22. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq., see also David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan, ‘‘Foxes in the Hen 
House: Animals, Agriculture & the Law,’’ p. 207, in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New 
Directions, Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2005).
23. J.B. Ruhl, ‘‘Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law,’’ 27 Ecology L.Q. 
263, 267 (2000).
24. Op. cit., p. 52.
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A new system of price supports guaranteed farmers a set price for their corn no matter the 
market price. This meant that growers had no incentive to decrease production when 
demand slacked. Instead, they were spurred to grow as much as possible and dump it into 
the market, which in turn caused prices to crater still more.25 As prices fell, successive 
farm bills lowered the guaranteed price paid to farmers, causing them to have to grow 
still more to eke out a profit. Consequently, the market became perennially glutted with 
corn, small growers all but disappeared, and the need to utilize the ever-growing surplus 
became ever more urgent.26
Growers began feeding the corn to animals, including cattle, whose digestive systems 
cannot tolerate it without prophylactic antibiotics and other medications.27 The feed itself 
was cheap but the consequences of the cattle ingesting that feed were not. From this 
tangled attempt to make efficient use of what should never have been grown, the factory 
farm emerged.
The story of other animals’ journeys from farm to Concentrated Animal Feedlot 
Operation (CAFO) 28 is similar, albeit different in certain key respects. For example, 
animal agriculture for pigs and chickens (not cattle) is highly vertically integrated.29 
Growers do not own the animals and have no input into the manner in which the 
animals are fed or housed.30 Growers also have little leverage with respect to the 
price they are paid for their labor. They cannot command prices sufficient to cover 
environmental degradation and waste disposal. As a result, these costs get external-
ized; they are passed along to the general public and not reflected either in the cost 
of production or in the retail price of the product.31 Instead, they become hidden 
25. Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meats (New York: 
Penguin, 2006), 52–64. See also Michael Pollan, ‘‘Farmer in Chief,’’ The New York Times, 
October 9, 2008.
26. Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meats (New York: 
Penguin, 2006), 52–64.
27. Michael Pollan, ‘‘Power Steer,’’ The New York Times, March 31, 2002. See also The Humane 
Society of the United States, ‘‘An HSUS Report: Human Health Implications of Non-
Therapeutic Antibiotic Use in Animal Agriculture’’ (2007). Available at: http://www.
diningatpenn.com/penn/env/poultry/poultry--hsus-human-health-report-on-antibiotics.pdf.
28. CAFOs are a type of AFO (Animal Feeding Operation). According to the EPA, an AFO is a lot 
or facility where: animals have been, are or will be stabled or confined for a total of 45 days or 
more in a 12 month period; and crops, vegetation, forage growth, or postharvest residues are 
not sustained in the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility. CAFOs are 
larger version of AFOs, containing 1,000 or more animals. See Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations, 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2008). For purposes of reducing the number of acronyms, I 
use the term CAFO in this essay generically to refer to all industrial livestock operations.
29. David N. Cassuto, ‘‘Owning What You Eat: The Discourse of Food,’’ 4 Revista Brasileria de 
Direito Animal 45 (2009), p. 53.
30. Op. cit, p. 53.
31. Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America (A Report of the 
Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production), p. 6.
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costs, which, along with corn subsidies, have become woven into the national tax 
burden.32
In order to turn agriculture into agribusiness, growers had to embrace large commer-
cial enterprises as superior and preferable to small-scale farming. The alternative was 
replacement by others more sympathetic to the corporate goal. The stated goal: making 
agriculture more efficient. The missing option – which to this day remains unentertained – 
involves interrogating the utility of efficiency as a bounding principle in agriculture.
In economic terms, efficiency means getting the best possible return on an invest-
ment. Any resources spent should lead to a greater yield. In this sense, efficiency is a 
fundamental principle of a market economy. However, agriculture – and specifically 
animal agriculture – is not economics. While economics drives many facets of agricul-
ture, that does not make them equivalent.
Agriculture relies on human/animal interactions, which are subsumed within the eco-
logical web even while also forming part of the human economy. The uneasy relation-
ship between ecological unpredictability and bottom line analytics has existed for 
centuries but the twentieth century witnessed market dynamics becoming dominant. As 
a result, the barnyard became the stockyard, the farmyard a CAFO, and the manure pile 
a sewage lagoon.
When market efficiency displaced ecology as the foundation of agriculture, another 
crucial component was lost as well. Ethics were once relevant to animal agriculture. 
While the welfare of nonhuman animals was never the priority, it lies beyond cavil that 
the treatment and care of animals in the days prior to industrial agriculture differed mark-
edly from animal treatment today.
Farmers used to house and feed animals in a manner that allowed the animals a modi-
cum of comfort and the ability to develop relationships, including with their human 
custodians.33 These relationships did not necessarily maximize economic yield. They 
were rather based on a set of normative guidelines (and economics) even as the ultimate 
reality of the animals’ commodity status inevitably imbued that bond with a sense of 
unreality.
One sees vestiges of this bifurcated relationship in agricultural education organiza-
tions like 4-H, where children are given animals to care, raise and nurture. Often, the 
children grow to love these animals, even as they are raising them for meat. The culmina-
tion of their efforts usually happens at county fairs; the animals are auctioned for slaugh-
ter, leaving the children grief-stricken and heartsick, while parents and teachers crowd 
around offering congratulations for a job well done.34
This complicated relationship between the children and the animals is emblematic of 
the tensions underlying the traditional approach to animal husbandry. It was impossible 
to escape the animals’ commodity status even as ethics demanded their decent treatment. 
32. David N. Cassuto, ‘‘Owning What You Eat: The Discourse of Food,’’ 4 Revista Brasileria de 
Direito Animal 45 (2009), p. 53.
33. David N. Cassuto, ‘‘Owning What You Eat: The Discourse of Food,’’ 4 Revista Brasileria de 
Direito Animal 45 (2009).
34. Anne Hull, ‘‘The Strawberry Girls,’’ The New Yorker, August 11, 2008.
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The advent of industrial agriculture eliminated the tension within the human/animal rela-
tionship by commodifying the animals completely. Animals went from partially com-
moditized beings whose value could be measured both in individual terms and as units 
of exchange to simple merchandise whose value derived exclusively from decreased 
costs of care and increased value at alienation.
The commoditization process confers an exchange value that, in the case of “meat” 
animals, gets realized through slaughter. For producers (milk cows, breeding sows, etc.), 
value emerges through maximizing productivity while minimizing costs. In neither instance 
does the animals’ quality of life enter the equation. Instead, economic incentive (the driver 
of exchange value) lies with minimizing the expenses of maintaining the animal while 
maximizing the yield resulting from its use and/or death.35 It is easy to see how this logic 
leads to factory farms designed to maximize profit regardless of the impact on animals.
2 Dead Animal Welfare
The basic incompatibility between interactions predicated on ethics and those predicated 
on commoditization means that relationships created through agriculture are inherently 
problematic.36 Nevertheless, the ascent of the factory farm resulted less from the inexo-
rable logic of the market than from a concerted effort to reimagine productivity as inclu-
sive of agribusiness methods. That in turn led lawmakers and regulators to exclude 
animal welfare issues that did not facilitate increased production and profit from legal 
consideration. The inevitable result was a focus on the viability of the dead animal prod-
uct rather than the experience of the living meat producer.37
Even as one can decry the law’s indifference to whether animals are living or dead, 
the genesis of that indifference is as old as the law itself. Every first year law student 
35. David N. Cassuto, ‘‘Bred Meat – The Cultural Foundation of Factory Farms,’’ 70 Law 
&Contemp. Probs. 59 (2007); David N. Cassuto, ‘‘The CAFO Hothouse: Climate Change,’’ 
Industrial Agriculture & the Law, policy paper commissioned by the Animals & Society 
Institute (2010); See also Gary Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Temple University 
Press, 1995), p. 25; Robyn Mallon, ‘‘The Deplorable Standard of Living Faced by Farm 
Animals in America’s Meat Industry and How to Improve Conditions by Eliminating the 
Corporate Farm,’’ 9 Mich. State. Univ. J. of Med & L. 389, 399 (2005) (explaining that even 
when a law protecting farm animals exists “[t]he law is violated due to the traditional corpo-
rate attitude of wanting to maximize profit and minimize expenses”).
36. As Marlene Halverson observes: ‘‘The ethical relationship of farmers to farm animals is 
unique. The farmer must raise a living creature that is destined to an endpoint of slaughter 
for food, or culling and death after a lifetime of production, without becoming cynical about 
the animal’s need for a decent life while the animal is alive. The farmer must somehow raise 
the animal as a commercial endeavor without regarding the animal as a mere commodity.’’ 
Jonathan Safran Foer, Eating Animals (Little, Brown, & Company, 2009), p. 242.
37. It’s also interesting to note that the vocabulary of animal agriculture labels humans as “pro-
ducers” and the animals who actually form the food as “stock” or “food animals.” Perhaps 
acknowledging the animals’ role as (involuntary) producers would permit them a degree 
of agency that the food manufacturing process and the legal system could not comfortably 
withstand.
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reads Pierson v. Post (1805).38 In that case, the complainant, Post, and his hounds were 
in pursuit of a fox when Pierson preempted the chase by killing the fox and carrying it 
off. Post sued claiming that the fox was his property and that Pierson had illegally inter-
fered with the chase. Pierson argued that Post had never gained possession of the fox and 
that therefore it was in the public domain. The question before the court was whether 
Post did indeed possess the fox. The court examined authorities stretching back to 
Justinian in order to determine the indicia of ownership of a wild animal. It concluded 
that killing or mortally wounding the animal demonstrates control and dominion and 
thereby possession. Thus, one gains ownership of a living animal by killing it.
In Post, just as in Harris, living and dead animals are legally equivalent and conflated. 
Though the concept is facially bizarre, just as in Harris, it is contextually intelligible. 
Hunters often claim rights to the same animal and the law requires a method for resolv-
ing such disputes. Proof of dominion or capture offers a logical means through which to 
do so. However, the rule only makes sense if one accepts the principle that a living ani-
mal and a dead animal are the same thing. This is an odd concept. Living people and dead 
people are fundamentally different; a corpse is not the same as a person. The same clearly 
holds true for nonhumans as well. Nevertheless, the court ignores the distinction because 
it is most concerned with the state of animal being (death) that has the most meaning for 
human society and commerce. That state of being is similarly the focus in Harris.
IV. Conclusion
Agricultural animals are not just raised for food; they are raised as food. Their care and 
treatment acquires legal relevance only inasmuch as it impacts the marketability of their 
dismembered bodies. With the wellbeing of the living animal excluded from the equa-
tion, “humane standards” take on an entirely different meaning. A slaughterhouse facility 
can seriously injure an animal, take in and slaughter animals already gravely sick or 
injured, and process them into the human food supply, all the while treating them 
humanely. This humane treatment is accomplished through the oversight of meat inspec-
tors whose mandate has literally nothing to do with animal welfare.
And with this reality, we return to where this essay began. A meat animal is not “meat 
and animal.” National Meat Association v. Harris makes plain that the law does not rec-
ognize or protect the lives of agricultural animals. An agricultural animal is meat from 
the moment it is born. Thus, no conjunction is necessary. Indeed, in a very real sense, 
“meat animal” is a redundancy. We should simply call them meat.
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